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Institutional change rarely satisfies the prior intentions of those who initiated it …
Change cannot be controlled precisely … there are frequently multiple, not neces-
sarily consistent, intentions … intentions are often ambiguousinitial … intent can 
be lost. 
(March and Olsen 1989, 65–66)
Introduction
Defenders of the liberal international order (Ikenberry 2006; Ikenberry and
Slaughter 2007) and those who seek to support the spread and consolidation
of liberal democracy around the globe are today, as perhaps never before,
confronted by fundamental questions regarding the nature, extent and limi-
tations of external influence on domestic democratic development (Burnell
2005). In the first chapter we addressed those questions. For clarity’s sake let us
recall them again. Do western international actors, including the EU, play a
significant role in encouraging processes of institutional, legal and normative
change in transitional states? If so, when and how do external incentives, finan-
cial and technical aid, supported by conditionality, international democratic
socialization, diplomacy or sheer democratic example, influence national 
decision-makers to pursue alignment with a given externally driven model of
law, practices and beliefs? What combination of domestic structural factors and
agency-driven considerations, on the one hand, and external influence mecha-
nisms, on the other, are most likely to result in convergence with European rules
and practices? Does EU influence, where it exists, generate genuine implemen-
tation and internalization of reforms (‘real change’), or does it only solicit shal-
low, formal compliance, i.e. rule adoption alone? Does EU influence, where it
exists, follow the pathway of direct intergovernmental bargaining, or does it act 
indirectly, surreptitiously, through persuasion of epistemic communities and
other non-state elites who then promote a pro-EU alignment policy internally?
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The way we conceptualize and pursue these questions is important, not
merely for the purpose of plugging gaping holes in comparative politics,
democratization, international relations and international legal studies, but
for the many thousands of policy-makers and practitioners – in national devel-
opment and security agencies, multilateral institutions at the regional and
global levels, as well as non-state organizations and networks – who are strug-
gling with these very issues, with high stakes for the future of the interna-
tional system (Fukuyama and McFaul 2007; Ikenberry and Slaughter 2007).
In this volume we have sought to contend with this daunting conundrum by
sequentially: conceptualizing the key components of the puzzle and then
proceeding to propose an integrated analytical framework containing the key
variables necessary to capture the dynamics of external influence on domestic
democratic development. The resulting EUCLIDA model, therefore, provides
an integrated set of propositions against which the empirical findings of this
research can be applied and tested. More specifically, we have approached the
puzzle using the questions: whether and how a prominent international actor
has influenced processes of change in a given area of substantive dimensions of
democratic rule of law in countries struggling to achieve the transition from
hybrid regime to fuller, higher quality democracy? To address these questions
we have sought to trace evidence of external influence, as well as the interaction
between domestic and external factors, in four case study countries and across
five components of the democratic rule of law: (1) protection of civil freedoms
and political rights; (2) independent judiciary and a modern justice system; (3)
institutional and administrative capacity to formulate, implement and enforce
the law; (4) effective fight against corruption, illegality and abuse of power by
state agencies; and (5) security forces that are respectful of citizens’ rights and
are under civilian control. The five dimensions, accordingly, were analyzed
through a set of indicators of changes in democratic rule of law.1 Table 8.1 presents
the different specific topics we analyzed in greater depth.
Conceptually, we have approached the puzzle armed with a number of key
notions. First, we unequivocally endorse the view that even under conditions
of the strongest forms of external intervention, processes of democratization
are in reality an essentially domestic drama, in that they fundamentally
concern the manner in which a given demos is governed – a demos which
properly exists only at the national-state and sub-national (hence domestic)
levels. In the arena of democratization, in other words, the domestic and the
external are distinct, even though the modes of interaction between the two
levels may sometimes defy neat separation (see Chapter 1).
Second, we articulated a typology by which there exist different methods of
possible external influence on democratic development – control, conditional-
ity, socialization and the more passive, diffuse, democratic example – and
suggested that these varying methods may operate utilizing different logics of
influence (drawing on rationalist and norm-based theories of human conduct),
and may affect different domestic constituencies, both governmental and 
societal (see Chapter 2).
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Third, in an attempt to overcome the prevailing tendency among lawyers
and the few comparativists and international relations scholars who have so
far engaged with the topic, we posit that there are in reality different types
or depths of change we should be conscious to observe in the domestic system
as the result of external influence; that these types may be conceptualized as
constituting three main layers of impact – formal rule adoption, rule imple-
mentation and rule internalization; that each of these changes involves differ-
ent internal processes, and that the sustainability or reversibility of change
depends to a considerable degree on which layer of impact is attained.
Fourth, we highlighted the need to open up the black box of external–internal
interaction in democratization processes by proposing which actors, condi-
tions and modes of interaction may explain each of our three layers of change,
as well as positing an integrated framework that may help explain the rela-
tionship among all three. In doing so, we were conscious that we may find
ourselves under attack on charges that the EUCLIDA model neglects one or
more important variables, that it oversimplifies fiendishly complex processes
of change, or any other reasonable allegations of conceptual and methodolog-
ical crimes and misdemeanors. In reply we would offer only this: in outlining
EUCLIDA as a model we have responded to the desperate need to unpack the
proverbial black box within which external–internal interactions in democra-
tization processes have largely taken place; to propose a model so that it can
be the subject of debate; and, more immediately, to offer a concrete model
against which our four case studies can be tested. It is only through such trial
and error, we believe, that existing theoretical expectations can be checked,
rejected, refined, and ultimately improved.
Fifth, we have been mindful of the temporal dimension and the need to
build into our analyses clearer expectations regarding sequencing and dura-
tions of change through the notions of ‘cycles’, or phases of change, in which
the true significance of a given shift (the passage of legislation which the
existing government has no intention of fully implementing, the signing of
a treaty, or even the emergence of public discourse on a given topic) is mani-
fested only later, sometimes in unexpected ways.
Finally, differently from the ‘spiral model’ of human rights change, aimed
at establishing causal mechanisms in the process of change within that
domain with specific attention to the dominant actors and the dominant
mode of social interaction (see Risse 1999, 537–9; Risse and Sikkink 1999,
1–38), EUCLIDA was developed to offer an integrated framework drawing
on both interest- and norm-based theories of external influence on domestic
change. Moreover, the topics covered concern the five components of the rule
of law mentioned above and empirically analyzed in the country chapters. In
a nutshell, EUCLIDA serves different purposes in largely different domains.
As we also will see in these conclusions, the model of ‘membership condition-
ality’ (Schimmelfennig 2005a, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004;
2005a) has also been very useful both in the development of EUCLIDA and
in singling out variables and the empirical mechanism of conditionality
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detected in the empirical research. That model, however, is more effective for
rule adoption rather than rule implementation and internalization. Moreover,
in our complementing in pragmatic way (see Chapter 2 and Fearon and
Wendt 2005) the rationalist approach and the constructivist one as well as
the agency dominated literature on comparative democratizations, the net
gain of tracing empirically the ‘chain of anchoring’ should stand out in these
conclusions (see below).
At this point we can summarize the essential findings across the different
dimensions of the democratic rule of law in Table 8.2. More descriptively and
analytically, let us turn to highlight and examine the most salient findings.
Conditionality works for rule adoption! Sometimes …
Our findings support the assertion articulated by a number of recent studies
(Kelley 2004b; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005a; Vachudova 2005)
that the credible promise of large material and symbolic benefits – particu-
larly the ‘golden carrot’ of full EU membership, as Romania displays – is
generally effective in persuading national governments formally to adopt
rules and institutions they would otherwise resist. Conversely, where deter-
minate, credible, positive EU conditionality has been absent or weak – as is
generally the case in Serbia and Ukraine – and where only lesser material
incentives are on offer, such as financial aid without market access and insti-
tutional links, the achievement of formal compliance with externally
mandated rules has proven generally more difficult and less complete.
Examples of the two halves of this basic dynamic abound throughout our
case studies, lending empirical credence to the external incentives, rationalist
bargaining-based theory of external influence methodology (Schimmelfennig
and Sedelmeier 2005a). For instance, where the EU did not place pressure
for reform of the Romanian civil service in the early to mid-1990s, practi-
cally no progress on legislation in the field was achieved, despite the fact
that later on2 the topic was flagged as an area of concern in the Commission
reports. In a bid to improve Romania’s shaky stance vis-à-vis the EU and
NATO, a draft law was prepared in the aftermath of the first post-
Communist coalition government in 1997, but was consistently obstructed
in the legislature until its sudden passage by the same parliament on 8
December 1999 – days ahead of the Helsinki European Council, which was
to decide whether or not to open accession negotiations. The 2006 revisions
to anti-corruption laws, long lobbied for by the Council of Europe and the
Commission, were similarly enacted barely two months prior to the
Commission’s scheduled verdict on whether to invoke the delay clause that
would have pushed back Romanian accession by a year, from 2007 to 2008.
In the sensitive area of civil freedoms and political rights in Turkey, an 
analogous pattern emerges. It was only following the December 1999 
decision of the Helsinki summit to grant Turkey candidate status and the
publication of the first Accession Partnership reform program in March 2000,
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that no less than 34 constitutional amendments were pursued by the Turkish
government (with the overwhelming blessing of the legislature) in October
2001; reforms that were followed by a series of ‘EU harmonization packages’
adopted in the immediate aftermath of the December 2002 Copenhagen
European summit, which set December 2004 as a target date for the opening
of accession talks, subject to compliance with EU rules.
Another important effect of the conditionality method of influence, and
one that has so far attracted less systematic attention (see Jacoby 2005; Jones
1999) relates to its constraining, as opposed to enabling, role. In evaluating
the impact of democratic conditionality, in other words, we ought to be ready
to detect instances where the threat of external sanctions (either through the
imposition of punitive measures or the withholding of a benefit that would
otherwise have been provided) limits the range of policy options – producing
a “bounded rationality” effect (Jones 1999) – which is perceived by domestic
decision-makers as being realistically available to them. The Turkish mili-
tary’s hesitant warning that it might intervene over the perceived threat to
the secularity of the state caused by the nomination of Abdullah G¸l to the
presidency by the Islamist Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve
Kalkinma Partisi – AKP) in April 2007, serves as a case in point, with the
military’s response seen as circumscribed by fear of international opprobrium,
notably by the EU.
In contrast to the two membership-track case-study countries, we found
generally weak rule adoption in Serbia, and even more so, in Ukraine –
suggesting again the existence of a robust correlation between both the size
and credibility of EU rewards and the relatively insufficient power of alterna-
tive sources of external influence, notably US aid, the Council of Europe and
the OSCE, to achieve large scale adoption of formal reforms. The allocation
of financial aid, in particular, proved to be a poor predictor of formal rule
adoption. As Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.18 clearly demonstrate, although since
2000 Serbia has been by far the largest recipient of financial assistance among
the four countries (and the second largest recipient in rule of law sectors
specifically), even with regards to formal rule adoption alone, levels of aid
appear to be a poor predictor of positive external influence. Indeed, contrary
to the assertions of a recent impact assessment of USAID funding (see Finkel,
Perez-Linan, and Seligson 2006), we find little correlation between levels of
financial assistance and progress in rule of law development, suggesting that
financial aid may well be a relatively fringe factor in the totality of external
influence mechanisms.
Just as importantly, perhaps, the granting of ‘potential candidate’ status to
Serbia appears to have only moderately empowered change agents in the coun-
try; insufficiently at any rate to solicit the higher rates of formal rule adoption
identified in Romania and Turkey. In the field of fundamental freedoms, for
instance, EU, Council of Europe and OSCE pressure on Serbia, from 2003 onwards,
to reform its media and broadcast laws, produced the adoption of legislation
that was only partially in line with prescribed standards. Similarly, despite the
232 Leonardo Morlino and Amichai Magen
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fact that both the Council of Europe and the EU have made the adoption of new
legislation on associations a priority for Serbia, with technical expertise and
financial support provided by the Council of Europe for this specific purpose,
the Koötunica government has for years failed to legislate in this area,3 and a
similar pattern is evident in other policy areas, including the reform of the
judiciary and civil service. Moreover, unlike the Turkish case, the risk of 
international sanctions did not appear to delimit effectively the range of policy
options perceived to be available to the Serbian government at a moment 
of crisis. Following the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic´ in
Belgrade in March 2003, rather, the state of emergency declared by the
government was in practice used to justify widespread score settling with
political rivals and a host of extra-constitutional actions, including the firing
of 35 judges by the legislature, without the legally mandated requirement
that the Supreme Court consider and approve such a move.
On the whole, until 2005 the EU attitude towards Serbia was ambiguous.
The prospect of EU membership was too remote and the attitude of Brussels
officials toward Serbia was inconsistent: at times tolerating Serbian 
non-compliance and at other times severely punishing it through strict imple-
mentation of conditionality. As a consequence, there was a basic lack of credi-
bility that made political actors and people more and more sceptic on the
possibility and meaningfulness of the EU integration process. When negotiation
on the Stabilization and Association Agreement started (2005), that was five
years later than the initial granting of the status of ‘potential candidate’, the EU’s
promises gained more credibility with a partial improvement of compliance. But
this actually took place in the domains where European requests fitted into the
political designs of the incumbent leaders (see chapter on Serbia). Thus, the end
result was an unstable, provisional one, and it could even be reversed as stressed
by the negative consequences of 2007 elections,4 characterized by the success of
the anti-European Radical Party (28.6 percent and 81 seats) and several months
of non government.5 Here, ultimately, the role of party elites and their electorate,
closely bound up by the sovereignty claims on Kosovo with the Russian support,
largely accounts for those negative results.
The lack of a membership horizon and weak incentives offered to Ukraine
under the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) framework were, 
similarly, correlated with weak rule adoption and a negative example
supporting the principles of rationalist-bargaining models of external influ-
ence. Throughout the period of study what sparse evidence of formal rule
adoption there is – notably the Judiciary Reform Concept of 2001, and the
2006 ratification of the Council of Europe’s criminal and civil law conven-
tions on corruption – appears to have been driven by Ukraine’s membership
of the Council, rather than the result of EU conditionality. Indeed, out of the
four case study countries examined, Ukraine is undoubtedly the one where
EU influence has been weakest. It remains to be seen whether the ratcheting
up of incentives promised in the framework of the European Neighborhood
Policy (ENP) would produce any concurrent shifts in EU influence (Magen 2006).
Conclusions 233
9780415451024-Ch08  4/17/08  5:45 PM  Page 233
Two years into the ENP, it appears, however, that the lack of a membership
perspective, coupled with ill-defined alternatives of sufficient allure or credi-
bility, is matched by generally disappointing reform outcomes in targeted
states, even at the level of formal rule adoption.
Rationalist theories of external methods of influence are supported by our
findings regarding dynamics of change and resistance to change in low and
high cost areas of policy. Where costs of adaptation for potential veto players
were low or negative, i.e. where such actors perceived a net gain from change,
a quick cost-benefit analysis appears to have been made, and reforms easily
endorsed. A case in point is the raising of judicial and court staff salaries in
Romania and Turkey. Where the perception of the need for reform existed
prior to the advent of EU conditionality, and where no significant veto play-
ers coalesce to prevent reforms, similarly, we find evidence that mild condi-
tionality or even the mere presence of specific externally supplied
recommendations for reform, can be sufficient to galvanize internal reform
constituencies, particularly where institutional capacity is strong. Concrete
examples of this dynamic are found in Turkey’s reorganization of courts and
introduction of case management modernization with Council of Europe and
EU guidance in 2004.6 Indeed, observation of this area of Turkish justice
system reform suggests an impressive degree of positive “under the radar”
change, which can be readily missed against the background of more contro-
versial, “high politics” issues – such as freedom of expression and Kurdish
rights. In “low politics” policy areas, normative pressure alone (Kelley 2004a;
2004b), coupled with the absence of overt political sensitivity, Ministry of
Justice bureaucrats and court administrators have been able to coalesce
around Council of Europe and EU promoted standards and drive rule adop-
tion and implementation in seemingly technocratic, efficiency enhancing
areas.7 More interesting, of course, are the hard topics where, for a variety of
reasons, internal costs of adaptation are high and powerful elites are strongly
resistant to the direction or degree of change sought by external actors.
Several findings emerge from our analysis in this context.
Although the specific issues of contention varied somewhat from one coun-
try to another, all ‘high cost’ subject areas in the four case study countries
shared important underlying characteristics. In Romania, Serbia and Ukraine
it was the tasks of ending political control of the judiciary, reforming the civil
service, and fighting public sector corruption, which encountered the great-
est resistance to change. In addition, the establishment of effective civilian
control over a myriad of security forces represented an extremely difficult area
of reform in Serbia. For Turkey, in contrast, Kurdish minority rights and free-
dom of expression – notably the use of Article 301 of the Penal Code to
punish “insults to Turkishness” – proved the most contentious topics.8
What united all areas of special resistance to change can be summarized in the
two notions of ‘legacy’ and ‘executive control’. In all three post-Communist
countries the persistence of elites, formal institutions, socioeconomic
networks and political culture constructed under the previous, non-democratic
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regimes, translated into the most stubborn, reform recalcitrant veto players.
In Romania and Serbia, legacies were generally temporal in nature (with old
elites controlling key positions in post-transition state institutions), whereas
in Ukraine an additional spatial legacy hampered change, with the country
divided geographically into regions generally EU-oriented, and others firmly
controlled by Russia-oriented elites. Where no such legacies existed, as in
Turkey, areas of contention were different. Indeed, both of Turkey’s topics of
greatest resistance to change are attributable to the ‘Sèvres Syndrome’ – a
legacy of the Kemalist world view.9 Moreover, legacy barriers to change were
notably severe where predatory elites of the old regime remained essentially
intact – as in the case of Serbian security forces, and to a lesser degree in the
Romanian civil service – or where a symbolically charged collective memory
was popularly perceived to be reflected in a contemporary threat – as in the
instance of Turkish fears over Kurdish separatist ambitions.
Persuading national executives to abandon or otherwise reduce their 
stranglehold over other branches of government emerged as a second promi-
nent pattern. Whereas the goals of modernizing courts and improving the
efficiency of case management encountered little opposition from national
governments, the strengthening of judicial independence through removal of
executive control of appointments, promotions or the finality of judgments,
met with potent resistance across all four case study countries. In Romania,
Serbia and Ukraine, moreover, legislatures were found routinely to obstruct
legislation and institutional development that threatened vested interests,
notably in the areas of the judiciary system and the fight against corruption.
More crucial than the variable cost of adaptation, however, has been found
to be the related, and in some respects a priori, factor of the nature of domes-
tic decision-makers themselves. The degree to which the EU has been able to
affect rule adoption in targeted countries, more specifically, relates closely to
the constellation of political parties in the country, and at the more micro level
the presence or absence of ‘change agents’, which can sometimes be small
groups or even individuals opportunely positioned within state institutions.
Regarding political party constellations, our findings support
Schimmelfennig’s expectations that the effects of EU membership incentives
on compliance with liberal-democratic norms will depend in large part on the
party constellation of the target country (Schimmelfennig 2005). Therefore, in
countries with mixed party constellations – where no elite consensus on liberal
democracy exists but where liberal parties or coalitions have been able to gain
electoral power, often alongside superficially constructed communist, nation-
alist or populist parties – we should expect to see the most powerful EU
incentives, at least, achieve effective influence, albeit at a more protracted rate
and with ‘fits and starts’ patterns of change, as compared to countries with a
liberal party constellation (such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland). In contrast, countries with illiberal party constellations – ones 
dominated by communist, nationalist parties reliant on anti-liberal ideologies
or authoritarian practices of power retention – would be expected to be 
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non-responsive to EU membership incentives.10 The interplay between external
incentives (their objective and subjective attractiveness, credibility and
immediacy), on the one hand, and the constitution and conduct of domestic
party constellation, on the other hand, remains a subject in need of more
detailed inquiry. Nonetheless, our findings shed further light on the topic.
Our findings extend essentially the same logic beyond enlargement cases 
per se, to Serbia and Ukraine, suggesting that the essential dynamic holds even
where the prospect of EU membership is shaky, though not entirely absent;
EU leverage may still empower those we call change agents, i.e. elite
reformists, operating within a mixed party constellation. In Serbia therefore (as
in Romania) we observe that the replacement of illiberal party constellations
with mixed party ones, under both the Djindjic´ and Kosˇtunica governments,
resulted in the predicted pattern of response to external incentives. In fact,
two such patterns can be detected. Formal rule adoption (as well as internal-
ization and implementation) proved quicker and smoother than under more
illiberal party rule. Furthermore, areas of policy in which little or no progress
could be made under an illiberal party constellation – notably civil service
and police reform, and the adoption of rules improving judicial independence
and attacking corruption – achieved breakthroughs, at least in terms of
formal rule adoption. The relative weakening of veto players11 and relative
empowerment of change agents specifically in the executive and legislative
spheres, in other words, not only increases the pace of rule adoption, but also
opens up new possibilities for progress in areas deemed too costly for adapta-
tion under the old regime. Conversely, as the frustrating experience of Serbian
constitutional reform efforts in the period 2000–06 starkly demonstrates –
with weak liberal forces contending with powerful anti-reformist veto play-
ers able to win substantial support in the ballot box – despite strong external
pressure, basic changes to the Milosˇevic´ era anti-democratic Constitution
have proven slow and limited.
Significantly, the same dynamic appears to hold in the case of Ukraine,
although here the picture is somewhat murkier, on account of the short dura-
tion since the Orange Revolution and the chaotic struggle for power between
competing liberal and illiberal elites unfolding in the country since
December 2004. With these reservations in mind, however, it appears 
that both the pace and boldness of rule adoption have increased slightly since
the replacement of the Kuchma regime, as the January 2006 decision by 
the Yuschenko government and Verkhovna Rada to anchor Ukraine to the
Council of Europe GRECO anti-corruption monitoring system attests. 
It remains to be seen whether the new Action Plan for Ukraine, in the frame-
work of the ENP, leads to faster, smoother alignment of Ukrainian legislation
and policies with those of the European bloc, and, if so, under what domestic
party conditions.
A possible challenge to the liberal/mixed/illiberal hypothesis in explaining
the propensity of liberal external actors to influence domestic reform dynamics
successfully is posed by the experience of Turkey. Commentators are ambivalent
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about how to classify the moderately Islamist AKP, which gained a near-
absolute majority in the Grand National Assembly in November 2002,
better results in the local elections of 2004, and an even greater success in the
general elections of July 2007. This party has pursued faster and costlier
domestic reforms than were imagined possible under the more secular and
classically liberal coalition government led by the Democratic Left Party
(Demokratik Sol Parti – DSP) since 1999 (Çarkogˇlu 2002; see also Özbudun
2007). What the Turkish experience seems to reveal instead – and what emerges
as a consistent theme in our findings – relates to the degree of stability of the
ruling government, rather than its composition per se.
Thus, with the singular exception of the crisis that involved the 
pro-European integration G17+ party credibly threatening to bring down the
Serbian government over a lack of Constitutional reform, we find that 
political volatility (whether caused by a fractured coalition or state of national
emergency) significantly hampers the pace and scope of rule adoption. The
clearest case in point here is found in the experience of Ukraine from the 
aftermath of the Orange Revolution onwards, where despite the popular 
election of a pro-European bloc headed by Victor Yuschenko and Yulia
Tymoshenko, incessant intra-coalition squabbles and prolonged constitutional
crises have largely paralyzed even formal reform. Unlike the conditions that
may precipitate democratic transition in the first place, in other words, the
development of rule of law conditions, pushing hybrid regimes in the direction
of liberal democracy, are best served by conditions of macro-political stability,
rather than a sense of crisis. It is where a reformist single-party government or,
to a lesser but still sufficient degree, liberal or mixed constellation party coali-
tion, meet the credible incentives of a powerful external liberal actor, that the
pace and scope of rule adoption in rule of law reforms proceeds best.
At a more specific level, we find evidence suggesting that meaningful
progress in rule adoption (as well as implementation) can be attained in some
sectors when external stimuli are matched by the presence of ‘change agents’
within a given arena of ministerial or bureaucratic power. Hence, in Turkey,
for instance, the prescription of justice system efficiency reforms, coupled
with the provision of financial and technical assistance, has spurred court
administrators and Ministry of Justice officials to adopt significant modern-
ization reforms. More interestingly perhaps, despite powerful veto player
opposition, a former human rights lawyer, Monica Macovei, managed to
leverage the threat of Romania’s exclusion from accession, as well as civil soci-
ety support, to push through substantial legislative changes in the composi-
tion and control of the country’s judiciary, in her capacity as newly appointed
Minister of Justice in 2004–05.
This analysis, however, still does not reply to the subsequent, obvious 
key questions. They are: where do the liberal-democratic parties or mixed
coalitions come from and where does stabilization originate? Liberal 
parties or, in our terminology, change agents do not come out of the blue;
likewise, a process of a party system or electoral stabilization is not without
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its own roots. But before dealing with these questions, other considerations
have to be added. First of all, the experience of all four countries confirms that
highly legalized, detailed external rules are more likely to be adopted by
domestic decision-makers than less legalized or vaguer standards (Abbott et al.
2000; Goldstein et al. 2000). Although we should not discount the possibility
of selection bias (i.e. that compliance with highly specific rules is more easily
detectable than are broader, looser norms), the superiority of more determi-
nate reform demands made by external actors runs as a consistent theme in
our findings. We see this across a range of thematic issues, from the abolition
of the death penalty in Turkey12 and Ukraine, to the ban on inter-country
adoptions in Romania, to the specific changes required by the EU of Turkey
in the area of civilian control of the military (such as the powers of the
National Security Council, the presence of military representatives on public
bodies, and the transparency of the military budget). The ban on the lucrative
business of providing orphaned children for inter-country adoption, passed
into Romanian law in 2004, is a case in point. EU pressure on Romania to
halt the supply of orphaned children for adoption worked, despite contrary
pressure from the USA and, more curiously, from a number of EU member
states, including France, Italy, and Spain.
Of course, highly determinate rules are by no means a panacea that guar-
antees success of rule adoption, as is starkly shown by the still unreformed
Article 301 to the Turkish Penal Code, which the EU has long demanded be
reformed. Yet such rules strengthen external influence by at once bolstering
conditionality and providing a concrete roadmap, which change agents or
domestic reformists can rally around and domestic governments find harder
to eschew. In contrast to a generally weak picture of rule adoption in Serbia,
therefore, the presence of the relatively comprehensive, detailed and institu-
tionalized rules against corruption embodied in the Council of Europe’s civil
and criminal law treaties and GRECO peer monitoring mechanisms, appear to
have significantly contributed to the speed and substance of the anticorruption
legal framework in the country, especially from 2003 through 2005.
Conversely, where specifically framed international rules are absent, where
the EU has applied less specifically framed conditions – as has been the case
with standards on the judiciary in the 2004 European Partnership set by the
EU for Serbia (see Chapter 6) – or where the core of change sought lies not in
specific legal rules, but in changes to the spirit of the law and normative
modes of conduct, positive developments are far fewer, or at least far more
difficult to detect. Thus, on the whole we find greater progress in rule adop-
tion in the areas of civil and political rights and technical reforms to the
administration of justice, than the more diffuse, normative independence of
the judiciary, institutional and administrative capacity, and civilian control of
security forces. An operative conclusion that can be drawn from these find-
ings pertains to the need for a broader range of detailed regional and interna-
tional rules on key issues of democratic quality and good governance, similar
to the Council of Europe’s two treaties on corruption and GRECO monitoring
mechanism.13
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Moreover, when credibility is considered, its importance to the EU’s ability
to pressure targeted countries into rule adoption – in terms of capabilities,
costs and consistency of reward or sanctions – has been conceptualized 
elsewhere (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004, 661; 2005b, 13), requiring
no lengthy discussion here. Suffice to say that our findings support the
hypothesis that the external influence on rule adoption increases with the
credibility of conditional promises and threats. This is clearly manifested in
the changes in Romania’s conduct, where relatively weak EU credibility (in
the sense that throughout the 1999–2004 period Romanian elites generally
assumed their accession would go through regardless of full commitment to
reforms) were partially replaced by the insertion of the suspension clause into
the 2004 Treaty of Accession. This suggests a degree of ‘wasted leverage’ in
EU–Romania relations through most of the last decade. In contrast, popular
and elite perceptions in both Europe and Turkey, regarding the reluctance of
a number of member states to accept Turkish membership have paradoxically
added a degree of seriousness to EU insistence on Turkish reforms. Yet the
maintenance of credibility through the stretching out of conditionality in the
Turkish case may well prove a delicate balancing act, with signs that EU
enlargement fatigue, rising cultural bias against the inclusion of a populous,
predominantly Moslem country, as well as French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s
blunt opposition to Turkey’s membership, may already be undermining the
pace of and commitment to reforms.
A further dimension of the credibility factor, and one less commonly recog-
nized, is illustrated in the conduct of Turkish prosecutors and judges when
confronted with the decision whether to bring forward and convict on charges
relating to freedom of expression, under Article 301 of the Penal Code.
Betting on the rise of anti-EU forces over the short to medium term, and fear-
ing professional retribution when such elements do come to power, prosecu-
tors and judges opt to defy the spirit of EU-mandated, liberalizing
requirements. Hence the perception of a lack of credibility in the long-term
prospects of accession is undermining conformity with externally driven
norms at the level of the prosecution and lower judiciary.
An example of EU conditionality acting indirectly came in Romania in
2000, when the EU cajoled the newly elected Social Democratic Party (PSD)
majority party into abandoning the option of including two extreme nation-
alist parties in the planned coalition – easing the inclusion of the Hungarian
minority party (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania – UDMR)
instead – by signaling that the alternative route would undermine accession
prospects. On several occasions, particularly in Romania and Turkey, civil society
organizations have been able to coalesce around externally proposed models for
change, or even bypass their national governments by urging Brussels to
include criticism and concrete reform demands in annual monitoring reports.
Another important aspect relating to formal rule adoption, which deserves
special mention, is the phenomenon of establishment of new institutions in
the domestic sphere in response to external demands. Two species of the
phenomenon emerge from our four case study countries. In the two countries
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targeted for transformation via pre-accession, EU requirements that candidates
develop regulatory and administrative capacities in preparation for member-
ship have led to the creation of new specialized agencies either within or along-
side existing ministerial structures. In Romania, for instance, the National
Agency for Civil Servants (ANFP) was established as part of the 1999 Civil
Servants Statute, but quickly marginalized through understaffing and non-
cooperation on the part of the established bureaucracy. Similarly, under intense
EU pressure, a National Anti-corruption Prosecutor’s Office (PNA) was created
in September 2002, subsequently to become a battleground on which successive
reformist and obstructionist governments sought, respectively, to expand or
restrict investigative capacity and powers of prosecution. A further example of
this species of rule adoption can be found in the 2003 establishment of a new
Justice Academy in Turkey – a measure recommended by the Commission and
designed to bolster in-service training for judges and public prosecutors, notably
in EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights.
Examples of a more overt form of imposition of institutions (Owen 2002),
where external actors appear to seek the establishment of new institutions in
targeted countries as a means of bypassing, rather than supplementing
national ones, is found in Serbia and, to a lesser degree, Ukraine. Indeed, in
Serbia, where state ministries in the post-Milosˇevic´ era continue to be
plagued with poor administrative capacity and endemic corruption, the 2003
European Partnership document made the establishment of a Serbian
European Integration Office (SEIO) a specific priority, as the EU did for all
the countries involved in the enlargement. SEIO, which was established in
March 2004 in cooperation with the Commission (in Brussels and the
Belgrade Commission office) performs as a sort of implant within the Serbian
state, driving the day-to-day management of the Stabilization and
Association Process, progressive harmonization of Serbian legislation with
the acquis communautaire, and coordination with Serbian ministries. A differ-
ent model of institutional adoption, but one which, like SEIO in Serbia, blurs
the distinction between domestic and foreign institutions can be found in the
Ukrainian formulation of the November 2005 Judiciary Reform Concept.
Here, in response to mounting external pressure that Ukraine “continue the
reform of the judiciary in order to ensure its independence and effectiveness”,
President Yuschenko entrusted the task of formulating the proposed reform
to a National Commission comprising OSCE, Council of Europe and
Commission officials, as well as Ukrainian government representatives. These
examples demonstrate the difficulty of drawing sharp lines of distinction not
merely between purely external modes of influence and domestic decision-
making in the area of rule adoption, but equally between conditionality and
control.
The establishment of new institutions in the domestic sphere at the behest
of the EU represents a form of external influence amounting virtually to a
form of direct imposition. We observe two distinct forms of such institutional
transplants. On the one hand, the specialized anti-corruption agency created
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in Romania, for example, constitutes a permanent professional agent intro-
duced into the domestic system as part and parcel of legislative reform, in an
area judged by external actors to require a high degree of technical specializa-
tion and ongoing monitoring and implementation. In this sense the insertion
of a new institution can be seen as an integral part of alignment with modern
regulatory practices. In contrast, SEIO constitutes a very different kind of
externally driven domestic institutional development; one motivated by the
EU’s need for a competent domestic partner, coupled no doubt by a deep
sense of frustration with the functioning of the established government
machinery. In this context, the specialized agency created is intended not for
the purpose of implementing a substantive policy area (anti-corruption, trade
or competition), but as a surrogate decision-making institution, able to pool
administrative capacity into a single functioning institution from generally
weak state ministries for the primary purpose of acting as a liaison institution
vis-à-vis the external actor.
In both cases the externally mandated establishment of new institutions
creates at least new opportunities for domestic change agents. In the former,
with the establishment of a new specialized agency, at a minimum a new
policy discourse is created. Where the government does not completely
obstruct the action of the new institution – allocating staff, funding and
allowing a degree of political clout – opportunities for implementation and
internalization greatly increase, at least within the substantive area of policy
for which the new institution is responsible. Indeed, coupled with strong,
credible conditionality and continued external monitoring, the insertion of
specialized professional agencies into the domestic system may prove to be
the most potent promoter of progressive rule adoption, implementation and
internalization. On the other hand, institutions such as SEIO, although they
also provide a forum for the development of domestic knowledge and change
agent constituencies, run the risk of further disempowering existing state
institutions and increasing local dependency on external actor capacities.
However, here, a sort of socialization mechanism has a greater and better
effect than the contracts and twinnings we mentioned in Chapter 3, but was
disregarded in the empirical analysis of the countries as irrelevant for the
actual development of the rule of law.
But mind the gap…
Thus, were we to limit our inquiry into the ability of the EU to affect the
adoption of legislation and the establishment of formal institutions, our
conclusions would be partial and possibly misleading. Such an inquiry would
rightly leave open the question (at least for non-lawyers) of how ‘real’ is the
change? Are rules adopted implemented? Do the norms and standards to
which national governments subscribe taken seriously, even internalized and
believed in by ruling elites? As the summary of our findings on these ques-
tions in Table 8.2 plainly demonstrates, in all four case study countries, and
Conclusions 241
9780415451024-Ch08  4/17/08  5:45 PM  Page 241
across practically every dimension tested, there exist substantial gaps between
the formal commitments adopted by targeted states, and the reality of 
implementation and internalization found to have taken place.14
Although in our codebook and then in the fieldwork we paid special atten-
tion to the assessment of the implementation of various laws on the issues we
were considering in greater depth (see Table 8.1), we accept a bias in the
possible amplification of the gap, due to the inherent methodological diffi-
culties of coding implementation (in the end we have to trust the evaluation
of the interviewees, complemented by the expertise of the researchers) and,
even more so, of assessing internalization (when is civilian control of the mili-
tary sufficiently internalized?). However, even if we account for such an
amplification, the pattern that emerges is stark. It provides both empirical
support to Hathaway’s suspicion of a yawning gap between a country’s formal
international obligations, on the one hand, and degrees of normative attach-
ment to and implementation of those commitments, on the other (Hathaway
2002), as well as added impetus for policy-oriented research into the means
of narrowing the gap (Chayes and Chayes 1995).
On the whole, even if we consider only the last periods of our research
(2005–06), complete or fairly complete rule adoption has been achieved only
in relation to the death penalty and the modernization of the justice system,
while minority rights, independence of judiciary and civil service reform are
still problematic. When implementation is assessed (see Table 8.2), the death
penalty is the only sector where implementation has been fairly easily carried
out, with the exception of Ukraine. The worst sectors in this respect are inde-
pendence of the judiciary, civil service reform and policies to improve admin-
istrative capacity and to combat corruption. The comparisons among rule
adoption and rule implementation show that the worst sectors in the first
layer are also usually the worst in the second, but at the same time there are
policies, such as anticorruption ones, especially those at bureaucratic level,
where the gap is even more marked. That is, it is impossible to declare openly
that those policies are actually refused or that refusal appears clearly at the
moment of implementation. Internalization is the last, most difficult step,
and in some cases it was also very difficult, if not impossible, to assess it
adequately in the different sectors; it was out of public view.
Accordingly, we also find considerable evidence of deliberate “emptying of
content” – the practice of national governments, or veto players within
government and the bureaucracy, proceeding to dilute the effects or otherwise
subverting the intended goals of legal reforms following rule adoption –
particularly in Romania, Serbia and Ukraine – though, interestingly, rela-
tively less so in Turkey.15 A telling case in point is the passage of the National
Agency for Integrity (ANI) law submitted to the Romanian Chamber of
Deputies as part of the country’s specific commitments to the EU in the
immediate post-accession period in 2007. Rather than reject the rule outright,
which the four parties that opposed the law had the votes to do, amendments
were introduced into the law at the last moment, which effectively obliterated
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the planned independent status of the ANI and took the sting out of its abil-
ity to carry out asset declaration investigations of public officials, including
parliamentarians. Similarly in Serbia and Ukraine, coalition governments
seeking to weather a coalition crisis, alleviate international pressure or gain a
short-term reward, rushed to endorse a high visibility law or institution, and
then proceeded quietly to subvert or dilute its implementation. In some
instances a measure of formal rule adoption designed to improve the func-
tioning of the justice system was subsequently utilized to undermine key rule
of law principles. Thus, the establishment of specialized economic courts in
Ukraine in 1992 was hijacked by predatory elites in an effort to enable them
to gain and hold on to privatized state assets.
Not surprisingly, perhaps, such “subversive compliance”, as well as the
more benign instances of “fake compliance”, tend to occur in the nexus
between strong international pressure and areas of high adaptation costs for
ruling elites – in our cases, notably the independence of the judiciary and
measures to fight political corruption. In such circumstances, the domestic
elite wishing to avoid the high costs of outright rejection of externally
mandated reforms, accepts rule adoption and then proceeds to avoid the high
costs of implementation by diluting the rules adopted or otherwise hamper-
ing implementation. Theoretically, the pattern lends credence to rational-
choice explanations of agency conduct, displaying the workings of a “logic of
consequence”, rather than a logic of “appropriateness” (March and Olsen
1998) in domestic decision-making, while in operational terms it highlights
the need for careful monitoring and other follow-up enforcement and imple-
mentation assistance mechanisms, particularly where domestic costs of 
adaptation are high (Chayes and Chayes 1995).
Existing substantial gaps between formal rule adoption, on the one hand,
and implementation and internalization of rules and norms, on the other
hand, do not suggest that we find no evidence of the latter. What emerges
from a comparative reading of the cases (see Chapters 4–7) suggests that in
those countries where transition to democracy took place a decade ago or
more, and with which the EU has engaged using pre-accession strategies for a
similar length of time, we find evidence of not insubstantial implementation
of reforms, and to a lesser (but still significant degree) signs of habituation,
perhaps even identity type of internalization.16 So, for instance, the
Romanian police force stands out as an institution that has experienced a
significant shift in culture, as reflected in recent polling data, in which 
50 percent of respondents expressed the view that police reform was heading in
a positive direction – a higher ranking than those accorded by the public to
the judiciary, healthcare and educational systems. In Turkey, similarly, instances
of torture in police detention and prisons have dropped dramatically since 2002
(aided at least in part by strict EU conditionality, funding for training of foren-
sic investigators and a large-scale twinning program for police, medical profes-
sionals, judges and prosecutors); courts have begun to apply reforms in the areas
of fundamental freedoms, albeit only partially, and have undergone significant
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modernization; and there is credible evidence to suggest a genuine weakening
of the military’s control of civilian government, at least in the period 2002–06.
When internalization is considered, in all four case study countries, but 
particularly in Turkey and Romania, these rather weak effects are at least
partially mitigated by the evidence of “discourse diffusion” – characterized by
recurrent liberal concepts and themes (the value of freedom of expression, the
equity of minority rights, policing as a protective service to the citizenry
rather than an instrument of state repression, the prevention and avoidance of
corruption and so forth). In Turkey, especially, an intense public debate has
emerged over the last several years over some of the most sensitive issues
supporting liberal-democratic consolidation in the country – notably the
treatment of Moslem and non-Moslem minorities, gender equality and the
role of the military in public life – with both official and civil society actors
using the language of European integration and supranational European
norms (notably the European Convention on Human Rights) to justify and
promote reforms.
In contrast, we find fewer indications of genuine implementation or induc-
tion into liberal norms in Ukraine, and even less so in Serbia. One area where
financial and technical aid appears to have contributed to civil and political
freedoms in Ukraine is that of freedom of the media, where in 2004 only 
514 claims against journalists were submitted to the courts, compared to
2,258 such claims submitted in 1999. On the whole, however, the gaps between
the limited rule adoption achieved in Ukraine and Serbia, and effective
implementation appear to be larger than for Turkey in particular, but also
Romania.
What accounts for these patterns? Under what conditions do we find more
extensive, deeper forms of compliance involving genuine implementation and
internalization? While the conceptual and methodological challenges of
providing reliable answers to these questions are considerable, particularly on
account of the psychological element involved in evaluating internalization,
several important considerations can be proposed in this context.
As Table 8.2 demonstrates, the relationship among rule adoption, imple-
mentation and internalization is a weak one. That is, in spite of a stronger
conditionality in terms of determinacy and credibility there is an incomplete
or largely incomplete rule adoption and consequently poor implementation,
and even poorer internalization.17 For Romania, this is the case with minority
rights, independence of judiciary, civil service reform, and anticorruption
policies; for Turkey, with minority rights, independence of judiciary, consti-
tutional reform, and police reform; for Serbia, with civil service reform and
civil control of the army present the weakest links; finally, for Ukraine, with
constitutional reform, civil control of the army and police reform.
As can be seen in Table 8.3, the sectors were conditionality has the weak-
est effect are characterized by the presence of relatively weaker change agents
who are challenged by powerful veto players and can only be undermined by
the protracted action of the external actor, such as the EU. Thus, for Romania
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we find in the sectors just mentioned: Hungarian ethnic party versus the
Communist successor party strengthened by the rooted cultural attitudes of
the old communist legacy; the Minister of Justice and the cabinet versus the
Conservative Superior Council of Magistracy and the Constitutional Court;
the unopposed incumbent parties complemented by bureaucratic inertia;
again, the Minister of Justice and the cabinet versus a number of MPs from
different parties. For Turkey, domestic NGOs differentiated by widespread
cultural attitudes, additionally strengthened by the Sèvres Syndrome; an
unopposed Ministry of Justice in a context where there is an ideological divi-
sion between the incumbent AKP (see above) and the judicial establishment;
the government supported by civil society versus the conflicts between cabi-
net and presidency; cabinet supported by civil society, but blocked by a
weakly effective bureaucracy. For Serbia, the weakness of change agents and
the strength of groups within the armed forces is enough to explain the weak
links. Finally, for Ukraine the contrast between the Orange coalition, as
change agent, and other parties in parliament and groups inside the army and
the police accounts for those weak links.
An additional litmus test can be carried out. From Tables 8.2 and 8.3,
combining the qualitative analyses for the four countries, we can detect that
conditionality is more effective, that is, the links between the impulse
coming from the EU and the outcome are stronger, when either there are no
veto players or they are weak or very weak, or, alternatively, when the topic
is relatively minor in the country in the presence of change agents. Thus, for
example, the first hypothesis applies in the case of minority rights in Serbia
and the second in Ukraine; on freedom of press, speech, and association, in
Serbia no veto players are manifest; on modernization of the justice system,
in Turkey the first hypothesis applies, while in Serbia it is the second that
explains the stronger influence and results; on civil control of the army, in
Romania the first hypothesis applies.
This analysis helps us to make a first set of concluding remarks. The first 
one concerns the importance of institutional and administrative capacity for
effective implementation. Unlike rule adoption, which entails governmental
consideration and an official act of decision whether to accept, amend or
reject a formalized idea, rule implementation requires the exercise of govern-
mental command, often involving the coordination, instruction, mobilization
and monitoring of large bureaucratic organizations. Even where few barriers
to formal rule adoption exist and a genuine normative commitment to change
on the part of all critical stakeholders prevails, implementation may be
blocked or, at least severely hampered, by either bureaucratic inertia or sheer
lack of institutional and administrative capacity on the part of agencies
charged with implementation. Among the factors that may explain the 
relatively smaller gap between formal rule adoption, on the one hand, and
implementation, on the other in Turkey, is the stronger institutional and
administrative capacity of the Turkish state. In contrast, poorer implementation
in Romania and Serbia, especially, seems at least partially attributable to
250 Leonardo Morlino and Amichai Magen
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weaker implementation capability. Where reformists detect that the effective
implementation of formal legal and institutional changes is blocked 
by factors other than governmental veto player subversion, therefore, careful
analysis should be undertaken of possible means to reduce bureaucratic 
inertia and strengthen the capacity of implementing agencies. At the 
same time, we should expect in advance that rule of law reforms requiring
substantial mobilization of human and other resources – such as civil service
modernization and the implementation of new anticorruption measures –
would encounter greater bureaucratic difficulties, require heavy investment
in resources, monitoring and lesson drawing, and take longer to implement
than clear legal prohibitions (such as the abolition of the death penalty and
the removal from the law books of criminal provisions used to sanction 
journalists). However, we should emphasize that in its action the EU has been
laying particular stress on the need for civil service reform to improve 
administrative capacity, as can be seen in Tables 8.3 and 3.12, although the
results have been fairly modest.
Second, more so even than in formal rule adoption, the a priori presence of
domestic agents committed and powerful enough relative to veto players to
affect change is a robust indicator of the chances of successful implementation
and internalization. Change agents may not be able to implement all the
formal commitments undertaken by the targeted country (i.e. we would
expect a gap to exist between formal adoption and implementation even
where powerful change agents do exist), but without their presence the gap
between formal adoption and implementation will be larger, the propensity
for fake compliance will be higher, and internalization will be practically
nonexistent. The composition of party constellations, in particular, is a key factor
shaping the implementation of reforms, as state bureaucracies, let alone civil
society organizations and mass elements, are practically unable to implement
rule of law reforms without the active support of governmental actors.
The divergent experiences of the Hungarian and Roma minorities in
Romania serve as an illuminating example. Despite considerable normative
pressure from Hungary, the OSCE and the Council of Europe, in the early to
mid-1990s, the endorsement of minority rights norms was consistently resis-
ted by the Romanian Social Democrat Party (PDSR) government. It was only
after new elections, the subsequent change to a mixed-party constellation
government in 1996, and the entry of the Hungarian minority political party
UDMR into the coalition itself, that substantial policy, as well as legislative
progress, was made in the treatment of Hungarians by the state. In contrast,
where vocal, persistent external pressure to improve the lot of the Roma
minority was met by poorly organized domestic constituencies, lacking effec-
tive political representation, change was slower and very limited. Whereas
UDMR was able to pursue linkage politics to win advances for its minority
constituency, in the absence of a politically organized Roma change agent 
(in particular a political party able to wield coalition votes) progress on 
Roma rights was significantly hampered. At the same time, the Romanian case
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suggests that a degree of ‘spillover’ in the field of minority rights did take
place over the past 15 years. The voluble discourse over the issue, UDMR’s
presence in government, as well as the maintaining of the issue on intergov-
ernmental and NGO agendas by persistent external pressure, have resulted in
greater societal awareness and commitment of state resources to the integration
of minorities, and not merely to the Hungarian sector.
A third, related theme pertains to the ability of veto players to block
implementation. The experience of our case study countries demonstrates the
fact that veto players populate different sites of power, at different levels of
government, in different countries, highlighting the need for reformists, both
domestic and external, to identify pockets of veto player concentration in the
planning and execution of attempted reforms. In Romania and Serbia, for
example, the most powerful veto players have tended to be in the legislature
and senior civil service (with, in addition, the security forces acting as power-
ful retardants to the implementation of rule of law reforms in Serbia). In
contrast, the AKP’s overwhelming dominance of the Turkish legislature since
2002 has meant that governmental veto players have been relatively weaker,
with parts of the judiciary and public prosecution service surfacing as centres
of opposition to liberalizing reforms. Indeed, the role of the Turkish judici-
ary is instructive in this context, since it represents an example of a split insti-
tution, with the top echelons displaying greater openness to democratic rule
of law developments (even a degree of internalization attested to by an
increased use of EU law discourse in the pronouncements of the upper
courts), while the lower courts and prosecutors adopted anti-EU rhetoric and
assumed a more nationalist stance.18
At the same time, as in the area of rule adoption, we find some evidence of
“internal diffusion” of norms with cross-issue spillover taking place within a
given country. In Turkey, for example, the strengthening of general civil free-
doms and human rights legislation, coupled with the proliferation of civil
society organizations and intense public discourse on these subjects since
1999, has also facilitated the promotion of Kurdish minority rights, as the
dissonance between the two realms of rights became more visibly jarring.
This would suggest that the promotion of broad systemic reforms, rather
than narrow sectoral ones, could well produce positive externalities and unex-
pected synergies across different issue areas.
The fourth aspect to stress is how the different sectors of rule of law are 
interrelated. The most obvious set of considerations are those that stress the
salience of an independent judiciary for the effective implementation of civil
and political rights, for the policies against corruption or even the civil
control of the police, once the related rules have been adopted. But an important
additional point can be made explicit, by giving a closer look at Table 8.3 and
keeping in mind the different analyses on the four countries, it becomes clear
that change agents and veto players are often the same in the different sectors
of rule of law. More precisely, the same change agents and veto players are
found in different sectors and at the same time there are specific groups who
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are most directly affected by the change in the different sectors. Thus, among
the recurrent actors involved, we find in Romania, on the one hand, domestic
NGOs, parties, and government and, on the other hand, the Communist
successor party and other incumbent parties, and bureaucracy. In Turkey
there are domestic NGOs, government versus opposition parties, sectors of
the judiciary, and patronage mechanisms. In Serbia, there are domestic
NGOs, some opposition parties versus incumbent parties; in Ukraine,
NGOs, the Orange Revolution parties or, previously, opposition parties versus
components of the judiciary, members of parliament, members of the cabinet,
complemented by bureaucratic inertia. An additional consequence of this is
the presence of mutual influence among sectors. That is, progress in one
sector can imply progress in another.
Moreover, veto players are sometimes not explicit and what prevents 
democratic change by giving a common background to governmental and
non-governmental actors in the various countries is the persistence of 
widespread cultural attitudes. The Turkish case is very telling on this: what
in the end prevents this country from changing are those attitudes manifest
in the Sèvres Syndrome, in gender bias and in the other attitudes mentioned
in the chapter on this country (see Chapter 5). Of course, those attitudes can
eventually change, as has happened in other countries and at various points
in time, but the process takes time. This line of reasoning brings us to the
last brick of our theoretical building.
Times of change
Finally, what can we say about the temporal dimension of change – cycles of
change – and the issue of sequencing? These are questions which are increas-
ingly occupying scholars of democratic development (Carothers 2007). 
A substantial correlation emerged in the timing between periods where EU
membership conditionality is at its most credible and phases of rapid rule
adoption, and to a lesser degree implementation, in targeted countries. 
In Romania the confluence of the two occurred most strongly in the interim
between the announcement of the suspension clause and the decision whether
or not to invoke the clause and suspend the country’s accession for a year.
Similarly in Turkey, the period of greatest rule adoption activity took 
place during times when domestic elites were persuaded that the EU meant
business, that is, in the immediate aftermath of the Helsinki European
Council in 1999, but even more so in the period between the December 2002
Copenhagen summit and the 2004 decision to open accession negotiations
with Ankara.
In Romania in particular, moreover, we see instances where initial ‘lip service’
reforms formally adopted by governments unable or, more often, unwilling
to implement them, were utilized as bases or inspiration for more detailed,
involved reforms several years later, by successor governments that were
more liberal in their party constellations. Thus, for instance, the 1999 law
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on civil service reform, which was adopted only under intense EU pressure
in the run up to the Helsinki European Council summit that year, and
which failed to address a range of problems – including transparent recruit-
ment mechanisms, poor wages for civil servants and lack of transparent
rules for promotion – became the subject of civil society criticism and
renewed EU pressure four years later, leading to the law’s partial revision
under the PSD government in 2003, and then further revisions that finally
brought Romanian legislation into alignment with EU standards in 2006.
Similarly, the weak 1996 legislation concerning asset declarations passed,
but never implemented under the fractured Romanian Democratic
Convention (CDR) coalition, strengthened on paper under intense EU pres-
sure in 2003 and again in 2004, was seized upon in 2005 by a reformist
Minister of Justice in an attempt to strengthen substantially legal mecha-
nisms on asset declarations.19 Although Romania was a laggard in this
respect too, compared with those Central and Eastern European countries
that acceded in May 2004, these examples illustrate the generation of a 
‘virtuous cycle’ dynamic observed in other candidate states, with external 
pressure and reformist governments able to achieve a cyclical momentum 
of rule adoption and implementation, followed by another round of more
demanding reforms.
A similar, though perhaps weaker, dynamic is present in Turkey, yet virtu-
ally absent in Serbia and Ukraine, suggesting that the ‘virtuous cycle’, where
it exists, has so far been limited to pre-accession cases. At the same time, we
do find evidence for a somewhat different version of sequential change in both
enlargement and non-enlargement countries, one where discursive and
activist constituencies emerge following rule adoption, coalescing around
new topics or institutions. Although these groups are rarely able to achieve
short-term implementation of reforms, they are occasionally able to keep the
specific issue (freedom of expression, corruption, judicial independence,
police reform and so forth) on the agenda, and leverage the earlier acceptance
of the principles in legislation to further reforms when a relevant policy
window emerges. Interestingly, instances of rule adoption which are then
frustrated by lack of implementation or the perceived duplicity of the govern-
ment that formally committed to them, may act as a galvanizing factor for
domestic reformists. As the number of formal commitments to reform the
‘Soviet judiciary’ mounted in Ukraine during the 1990s, for instance, the gap
between the Kutchma government’s reform rhetoric, and the reality of its
inaction attracted growing opprobrium from Ukrainian opposition groups,
contributing to the drive for judicial reform in the immediate aftermath of
the Orange Revolution.
When the time factor is added, our ‘building’ is completed and we can
finally summarize the main elements of our empirical analysis and stress how
it also enriched our EUCLIDA model. In different ways and to a different
extent there has been a process of anchoring in all four cases. When the 
mist of membership is cleared, in Romania as well as in the other countries
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where this perspective was more distant, if present, the key mechanism of
conditionality remains relevant for the beginning of the process. Conditionality
brings rule adoption, but rule implementation to a much lower degree, and
only when some reform of the civil service has been successful.
To understand better such an external–internal nexus, our research brought
to light the salience of the emergence of opportunities created by external
actors and perceived by domestic élites, and in a few cases transmitted to 
citizens. Such an open, and in some cases collective, perception is easier when
there is a determinate and credible conditionality. Analytically, we could
make a distinction between the understanding on the part of a leader or
group that there is an opportunity to exploit and the translation of the oppor-
tunity into a successful change. So the end result of the entire game is in the
complex, multifaceted relationships between change agents and veto players,
where the public plays an indirect role that can become a determining one at
the time of elections. However, in the four countries and within the several
issues we explored, there were evidently situations characterized by a variable
geometry. That is, there are strongly value-motivated reformist elites who
challenge powerful veto players, even paying the costs of losing, or more
pragmatically interest-oriented elites who decide to engage in change actions
only when they think they are playing safe and success is very probable. In all
four cases there are both kinds of actors in different combinations. Thus,
following the EUCLIDA model the shift of cost-benefit balance is mainly the
result of the creation of opportunities, followed by different calculus done by
diversified actors, but in this the creation of opportunities is the crucial point
in bringing about that shift and the related origin of larger liberal parties or
change agents as well as some kind of contingent stabilization. Of course, a
stronger, steady stabilization is the result of other important processes that
may develop later on within the process of democratic consolidation.20
In this vein a negative position that affirms the failure of conditionality is
not supported by our empirical research. Conditionality may be weak and at
the end may even fail, but when all critiques are considered and even partially
recognized as legitimate,21 the mechanism of opportunity creation is still
there and at its core is conditionality, not with its legal aspects, but with its
actual effects. Moreover, while in the long run socialization can be an effec-
tive mechanism for bringing about change in democratic rule of law, actually,
such a mechanism is virtually impossible to detect empirically in the short
run, that is, within the limits of research such as ours. Thus, in the end we
have only two actual possibilities: an effective socialization-like mechanism,
which is characterized by the imposition of an office with the specific goal of
inducing adaptation and change, and the conditionality mechanism. But the
first mechanism is stronger when there is an accession path, as in Romania
and Serbia, but it is more difficult to set up, as in Ukraine and Turkey, and
even if established, would run into problems of sovereignty (see above on
this). Hence, empirically, conditionality remains the main mechanism of
influence. Of course, it can be greatly strengthened by more sophisticated
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monitoring practices. Moreover, in the process of anchoring, it is important to
understand the necessity of continuity of action by the EU, even complemented
by the Council of Europe and by other donors, as we have seen in our cases.
In conclusion, in a nutshell we found in our empirical research that the
external/internal nexus is characterized by a chain of anchoring where, if successful,
there are the following steps:
● continuous conditionality actions
● creation of opportunities
● perception of opportunities by different élites, and citizens
● weakening of veto players
● shift in cost-benefit balance
● rule adoption
● more substantive transformations
● rule implementation and related monitoring
● eventually, rule internalization when also structural or deeply rooted
cultural factors (such as the presence of alternatives in Ukraine, the
nationalism of Serbia and key widespread cultural attitudes in Turkey)
are changed or reassessed differently.
Are there lessons to be drawn?
On the basis of such a chain of anchoring and the related experience of the
research a number of lessons can be drawn. In a concise way, they include the
following:
1. Anchoring takes time, or more explicitly, creating some form of democratic
rule of law is often an ambitious goal that takes time and a large amount
of external stimuli and resources.
2. The entire strategy of democracy promotion has to have two core complementary
goals: strengthening change actors and weakening veto players.
3. These goals can be better achieved if there is a coordination of external actors,
particularly of the EU and the USA, otherwise the negative consequences
that took place in Ukraine (see Chapter 7) are unavoidable.
4. If there are structural reasons that give strong support to veto players,
such as serious ethnic cleavages and the presence of alternative political
models, a more moderate and modest strategy of promoting rule of law to
stop the worst practices of suppression and, if possible, a combined action
for modernization and protection of basic rights seem more appropriate.
5. As conditionality mainly brings rule adoption, the next steps such as imple-
mentation and internalization imply continuous action by the external
actors.
6. In that action, continuous monitoring and flexibility at the same time are
key, relevant aspects; a strictly legal approach may sound ‘right’ and ‘clever’,
but can actually misconstrue the situation, with negative consequences in
terms of rule of law, that is, achieving the opposite result.
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7. No ‘one strategy fits all’. On the contrary, there are different strategies
according to the different combinations of external conditionality and
the different domestic elites and citizens.
8. A close knowledge of each case is a prerequisite to develop a precisely
tailored set of external actions toward that case. For this purpose
EUCLIDA, which proved to be a useful integrated framework in our
research, can also help us to analyze the case we are interested in. To use
a metaphor EUCLIDA helps to make better X-rays or, if we prefer, a
better total body CAT scan.
And more precisely:
9. The five dimensions of the rule of law we exploring can be specified as
we did (see Table 8.1), and our research suggests that they are the most
effective and relevant ones. Consequently, paying attention to those
dimensions and more specific issues is important.
10. Those dimensions are partially or closely related. Consequently, every
strategy has to take into account all five dimensions that can weaken or
strengthen each other.
In sum, we are well aware that the recommendations above can only be appli-
cable to some countries, and not to others. That is, first of all, they are appli-
cable to hybrid regimes with groups, organizations, leaders, and movements
that can be or become change agents. In all other cases of stable authoritari-
anisms, it would be a waste of resources and time. And we are not sure that
in those cases there is actually an effective strategy of any kind.
A final point about this research. One of the main reasons for conducting
it has been the belief of the editors that a wrong way to promote democracy
is to promote façade democracies, where what there is behind the façade – 
for example, with regard to the rule of law – is ignored and only the strictly
formal aspects are considered. In this case, in fact, the impact is inevitably one
that delegitimizes this sort of regime as an unacceptable western product that
does not solve the actual problems of the people.
Notes
1 The codebook developed by the first author is available upon request.
2 Since 1997.
3 Freedom of association was explicitly mentioned for the first time in the 2006 Constitutional
Charter, mainly as a result of pressure by Tadic´ (see also Chapter 6 in this volume).
4 That took place when this research was already concluded.
5 Finally, a three party coalition cabinet with Democratic Party. Democratic Party of Serbia
and New Serbia and G17+ Plus was formed in May 2007 after three months of negotiations,
characterized by political scandals and clashes among those parties that upset the population.
The Radical Party was finally left out, although it had gained the plurality of votes. But
Kostunica introduced some of the Radical Party claims in his programme, namely the
preservation of Kosovo and Metohija
6 These findings are in line with Judith Kelley’s conclusions (Kelley 2004a; 2004b).
7 As Daniel Drezner (2007) demonstrates, the risk of losing sight of “under the radar” changes
in democratic developments exists in other regions of the world as well.
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8 Other ‘high cost’ areas were the Cypriot issue for Turkey, Kosovo’s secession and the 
cooperation with the International Criminal Court for ex-Jugoslavia for Serbia, although
strictly speaking Cyprus and Kosovo are not aspects of democratic rule of law.
9 In Chapter 5, it is recalled that the Sèvres Treaty partitioned the Ottoman Empire among
the European powers.
10 According to Schimmelfennig, in liberal party constellations EU incentives would not only
be effective, but the change achieved would also be “quick and smooth” (Schimmelfennig
2005b, 838). Writing in 2004–05, Schimmelfennig placed Romania in the mixed-party
category, and Serbia-Montenegro and Ukraine in the illiberal party category.
11 Here, of course, we only consider those veto players who are against democratic rule of law
reforms.
12 Although we know that it was a low cost reform, as that penalty has not been carried out
since 1984 and there is low public support for retaining the death penalty.
13 For a detailed discussion of this topic, examining the different degrees of compliance with
laws at the national, European and international levels, see Zurn and Joerges (2005).
14 As already discussed in Chapter 2. See there also for the bibliographical references.
15 In this country, however, there was an example of this kind that is worth recalling. 
As requested by the EU, in 2004 the courts for State Security were repealed. However,
other criminal courts were created which, according to the association of lawyers and the 
association for human rights, are working in the same way as the previous courts, but
under a different name. For example, the president of the association for human rights in
Diyarbakir made this comment, adding that the president of the previous court had been
also appointed as president of the new court in that same town. Apparently, according to
the association of lawyers in Istanbul, the appointment of the same judges was a recurring
pattern. This however, might be due to a lack of experienced personnel, as well as the
intention of the government to maintain the status quo. What is more important is the
claim that the decisions taken by the new organization follow those of the old one.
16 On the difference between different types of internalization, see Checkel (2005).
17 See in Table 8.2 the cases where there is at the same time strong conditionality and incomplete
rule adoption, that is, cases of inconsistency.
18 As Ali Çarkogˇlu stressed in a private communication, in order to understand the actual
autonomy of the judiciary, what is critical is that the judiciary looks at the party compe-
tition and veto players’ signals and acts accordingly. When the EU reformers are perceived
to be weak and likely to lose the next election, then the actors in the judiciary tend to 
play into the hands of the opposition hoping to exploit political and professional career
objectives when they come to power.
19 A law was finally passed recently in an improved version, but it remains to be seen when
the agency will be created and how effective it will actually be.
20 This topic will not be analyzed here. See, among others, Morlino (1998) and Diamond (1999).
21 The main criticisms by Kochenov (2007) are: “low threshold for meeting the Copenhagen
criterion of democracy and the rule of law, making the acknowledgement that a country
meets the Criterion largely meaningless”;
● “complete lack of clarity about the standards that the candidate Countries were
expected to comply with, making pre-accession democracy and rule of law assessment
extremely difficult, if at all possible”;
● “poor analysis quality provided by the Commission, including random choice of issues,
unreliable conclusions, numerous contradictions and a curious approach to democracy
and the rule of law. No serious assessment provided”;
● “lack of clarity about benchmarks to determine compliance. Consequently, no distinction
was often made between genuine reforms and legislative window-dressing”;
● “unjustified differentiated treatment of the candidate countries at all stages of 
pre-accession process”;
● “complete lack of connection between the Commission’s pre-accession monitoring and
the candidate countries’ progress towards accession”.
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